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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I.. >i I Hi' t" HuMI K, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
STEPI IEN G I IOI>, 1ER 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
-00O00-
Docket No. 200000008-CA 
nority JN 
-00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
• STATEMENT O F ISSUES PRESENTED b ( )R REVIEW 
1. Whetlier the trial court erred by dismissing the Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce filed by Defendant/Appellant, Stephen G Homer ("Mr. Homer") 
S 1 ATEMENT OF THE CASE. •• 
Homer filed his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce in July of 
1999. Plaintiff/Appellee, Kathe C. Homer ("Ms. Homer") filed her Motion to Dismiss 
on August 9" 1999 \ h e a i i n g >' "" ' M '< ' '"" I *, | <> "' '" ^ %i,y»| ?' * I (* W j y 11 ;« • i i i > n > i n 
October 29, 1999. The court took the matter under advisement and issued its ruling 
dismissing Mr. Homer's Petition on November 1 ! adim:^ ui bact and Order 
Dismissing; 1999. 
Mr. Homer filed his Notice of Appeal on December 21 , 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Homer and Ms. Homer were divorced, after nine years of marriage, by a 
Decree of Divorce entered in October of 1989. Under the terms of the Decree, Mr. 
Homer was ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Homer in the amount of $150.00 commencing 
July 1989. (R. at 306). 
In August of 1999, Mr. Homer filed a Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce. (R. at 448), seeking to terminate his obligation to pay alimony to Ms. Homer. 
Mr. Homer's sole basis for terminating his alimony obligation was the 1995 amendment 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5 (1953, as amended) which limited alimony, except in 
extenuating circumstances, to a period equivalent to the duration of the marriage. He did 
not allege that any changed circumstances with respect to either Ms. Homer's income or 
expenses or his own had occurred since entry of the Decree. 
At the time Mr. Homer filed his Petition, Ms. Homer had neither remarried nor 
cohabited. Ms. Homer filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr. Homer's Petition and filed a 
Memorandum in Support of her Motion. (R. at 449-454). 
In October of 1999, the lower court heard arguments on Ms. Homer's Motion to 
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. In its Ruling of November 1, 1999, the 
lower court granted Ms. Homer's Motion and dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition. (R. at 
482-489). Findings of Fact and Order Dismissing Petition to Modify were entered on 
November 29, 1999. (R. at 490-498). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MR. 
HOMER'S PETITION FOR MODD7ICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD 
REAFFIRMED 
In his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, Mr. Homer failed to allege 
that any substantial change of circumstances had ou mini nu i 1111 >. nl (In hn, HT nf 
oerly dismissed his Petition. The lower court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
II. MR. HOMER'S APPEAL IS I K I Y U I A J U S AISV ivia. 
HOMER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Ms. Homer has incurred attorney's fees (luc In \\\v iu.'< c^ny nl deU'iulmg ,ij.!,iUii^ t 
fication of Decree of Divorce and against his appeal of 
the lower court's ruling, and she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in connection with this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MR. 
HOMER'S PETITION FOR MODD7ICATION OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND ITS DISMISSAL SHOULD 
BEAFFntMED 
Homer argues that his alimony obligation to Ms. Homer should be terminated 
and relies on tne amenar: n s 
3 
amended) which limits an award of alimony, absent extenuating circumstances, to a 
period equivalent to the duration of the marriage in support of his claim. Mr. Homer's 
argument is without merit and the lower court properly dismissed his Petition for several 
reasons. 
First of all, Mr. Homer failed to allege that there had been any substantial or 
material change in circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce as required by 
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Mr. Homer's sole basis for terminating his alimony obligation 
was the 1995 amendment to Section 30-3-5(7)(h). 
When the parties were divorced in 1989, Section 30-3-5(5) and (6), UTAH CODE 
ANN. provided that alimony would terminate upon the recipient's remarriage or 
cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex. In 1995, subsection (7)(h) was enacted to 
limit an award of alimony, absent extenuating circumstances, to a period equivalent to 
the duration of the marriage. Mr. Homer argued that, therefore, subsection (7)(h) 
required the lower court to terminate his obligation to pay alimony as a matter of law. 
The lower court, however, found that subsection (7)(h) was not dispositive of the 
issues raised in Mr. Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce. It 
determined that that subsection merely limited the equitable powers of the court in 
awarding alimony. Contrary to Mr. Homer's argument, the subsection did not require the 
court to terminate previously entered alimony awards that extended beyond the duration 
of the marriage. 
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Second, Mr. Homer's argument that the amendment to the statute, if it does not 
apply to him, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, is without merit. He argues that the amendment creates two classes 
of obligors, i.e., those who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced 
prior to the effective date of the amendment, and those who only pay alimony for a 
period equivalent to the duration of the marriage because they were divorced after 
enactment of the amendment. 
The lower court properly concluded that the amendment does not violate these 
constitutional provisions because it does not create two classes of obligors. In its ruling, 
the lower court stated: 
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and 
Uniform Operation of Law Clauses apply whenever the 
government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and 
treat them differently. Subsection (7)(h) does not violate 
these principles however, because it does not create any type 
of classification, or treat one group any different than another. 
Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive law 
regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the 
courts in awarding alimony for a period longer than the 
marriage existed. 
(R. at 485). 
Finally, the lower court concluded that Mr. Homer was required to meet the same 
burden both pre- and post-enactment of the amendment, and that, therefore, subsection 
(7)(h) did not create different classifications of obligors, or treat Mr. Homer any 
differently than other similarly situated individuals who are obligated to pay alimony. 
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Specifically, it found that Mr. Homer "is not now treated any differently under 
Subsection (7)(h) than he was at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered." The 
standard Mr. Homer must meet in order to terminate his alimony obligation is the same 
now as it was when the Decree was entered, i.e., he has the burden to "show a 
substantial change of circumstances, subsequent to the decree, that was not originally 
contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P. 2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Prior to 1995, this was Mr. Homer's burden to establish; even with the 
enactment of Subsection (7)(h), his burden remains unchanged. Because he failed to meet 
his burden, the lower court properly dismissed his Petition for Modification for Decree 
of Divorce. This Court should affirm the decision of the lower court dismissing Mr. 
Homer's Petition. 
H. MR. HOMER'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND MS. 
HOMER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure defines a frivolous appeal as one 
that "is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Mr. Homer's appeal has no legal or factual basis and is, therefore, a frivolous 
appeal. See Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Ms. Homer 
has incurred attorney's fees and costs because of the necessity of defending against Mr. 
Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and against this appeal. 
6 
Mr. Homer, as a practicing attorney, has chosen to represent himself in the 
proceedings in the lower court and in this appeal of the lower court's decision. He has 
not incurred attorney's fees. Ms. Homer had no choice but to retain counsel to protect 
her alimony award. It is fair and reasonable that this Court should award her the 
attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in connection with this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He had not 
alleged that there had been any substantial and material changes of circumstances since 
entry of the Decree that were not foreseeable at the time of the Decree. Instead, Mr. 
Homer relied on the enactment of the amendment to UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5, 
specifically subsection (7)(h) as the sole reason his alimony obligation should be 
terminated. His reliance was misplaced. As the lower court properly concluded, the 
amendment merely limits the equitable powers of the court in awarding alimony; it does 
not terminate previously entered awards of alimony. The amendment does not create two 
different classes of obligors, as Mr. Homer was required prior to its enactment and since 
to meet his burden and show that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred 
since entry of the Decree of Divorce in order to terminate his alimony obligation. He 
failed to meet his burden. The lower court properly dismissed Mr. Homer's Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce. 
7 
Ms. Homer has incurred attorney's fees and costs defending against Mr. Homer's 
Petition and this frivolous appeal, and she should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of June, 2000. 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
&JL _^  
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this ay of June, 
2000. 
Stephen G. Homer, Pro Se 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, DECREE OF DIVORCE / 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Civil No. 87 2098 
Defendant. 
This matter came on before the Honorable Ray M. Harding for 
trial on the 13th day of July, 1989. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The 
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Brent D. 
Young. The Court, after having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from and 
against the Defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences which Decree shall become final upon entry of the 
same in the records of the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody, 
and control of the minor child of the parties subject to the 
J^Jr* 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Defendant's right to visit with the child at reasonable times and 
places. Specifically, the Defendant shall be allowed to visit as 
follows: 
(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday night at 6:00 p.m. with the child to be 
returned one hour prior to church and may pickup the 
child one hour after church is over. 
(b) During the week in which the Defendant does not 
have overnight visitation, he shall be allowed to 
visit with the child on Wednesday evening from 5:00 
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(c) The Defendant shall have the right to visit with 
the child on alternate holidays from 10:00 a.m. to 
6:00 p.m. Holidays shall be January 1, President's 
Day, Memorial Day, Easter, July 4, July 24, Labor Day, 
Thanksgiving and Christmas as hereinafter defined. 
(d) The Christmas holiday shall be divided between 
the parties. The Christmas vacation will be the time 
that the child is out of school for Christmas. During 
1989, the Defendant shall have the right to the child 
from the time the children are out of school through 
December 25 at 2:00 p.m. The Plaintiff shall have the 
right to the child from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until 
2 
minor child about the other, 
(i) All visitation periods shall be exercised in a 
prompt manner so that both parties can make their 
plans accordingly. The noncustodial parent shall pick 
the child up from the front steps of the custodial 
parent's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior 
and no later than 15 minutes after the visitation 
period commences. Return of the child to the front 
steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also 
be subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial 
parent shall have the child fed and ready on time for 
visitation with sufficient clothing packed and ready 
for the visitation period. 
(j) In the event the child is ill and unable to 
visit, a makeup visitation will be allowed to the 
noncustodial parent on the next succeeding weekend. 
However, if the noncustodial parent fails for any 
reason not to exercise his visitation for reasons of 
health or for any other reason, there will be no 
makeup visitation. 
(k) The child will not be permitted to determine 
whether she wishes to visit with the noncustodial 
parent. Personal plans of the custodial parent or 
4 
the child goes back to school. The parties shall 
rotate from year to year the part of the Christmas 
vacation that they have with the child. 
(e) The child shall be with the father, the Defendant 
herein, on Father's Day and his birthday from 10:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The child shall be with the mother, 
the Plaintiff herein, on Mother's Day and her 
birthday. Father's Day and Mother's Day as with other 
holidays shall take precedence over normal weekend 
visitation. 
(f) As it relates to summer visitation, two weeks of 
summer visitation shall be allowed. 
(g) It is ordered that if holidays occur on a Friday 
or a Monday and the Defendant is entitled to the 
weekend visitation either immediately before or after 
the holiday, he shall have the right to have the child 
for weekend visitation and the holiday without the 
need of bringing the child back to the Plaintiff. 
(h) All visitation in this case shall occur at the 
curb side and the Defendant is restrained from coming 
onto the premises of the Plaintiff. Neither party 
shall annoy or harass the other party and neither 
party shall make any disparaging comments to the 
3 
child, school activities, church activities, or other 
consideration will not be reasons for failing to 
adhere to the visitation schedule set forth in the 
order. Only substantial medical reasons will be 
considered sufficient for postponement of visitation. 
(1) Both parties will provide addresses and contact 
telephone numbers to the other party and will 
immediately notify the other party of any emergency 
circumstances or substantial changes in the health of 
the child. 
(m) The noncustodial parent s h a l l , i n addition to the 
v i s i t a t i o n s e t forth in t h i s order, have the unlimited 
r i g h t t o correspond with the minor c h i l d of the 
p a r t i e s and t o te lephone the minor c h i l d during 
reasonable hours without interference or monitoring by 
the c u s t o d i a l parent or anyone e l s e , in any wayv so «* 
Phone &sf/s <\v\a/ oiUr Correspondence <Xf£ ktpr uvtftiV rtAscx^bfe. -/rvm^j. 
ttaiesis o therwi se agreed t o between the p a r t i e s ^ 
telephone contfereixQ^sbetween the nonsu^waTal parent 
and the ch i ld sha l l be^4*J&ited--tGno more than once 
per week and^^shSll be, in t o t a l , 15 minutes^tr1^^^ssin 
djw?tf€ion. 
(n) Both p a r t i e s are restrained and enjoined from 
making derogatory and disparaging comments about the 
5 
other party or in any other way diminishing the love, 
respect, and affection that the child has for either 
party. 
(o) Defendant shall give Plaintiff 48 hours advance 
notice if he does not intend to exercise any 
visitation set out herein. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the home and property located 
at 1015 East 500 North, Orem, Utah, free and clear of any 
interest of the Defendant and the Defendant is ordered to quit 
claim any right, title or interest that he has in the home and 
property to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff shall be responsible to 
pay any debts and obligations owing on the property and shall 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
4. The Defendant is awarded the home and property located 
at 2877 West 9150 South in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
free and clear of any interest of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 
is ordered to quit claim any interest that she has in the home 
and property to the Defendant. The Defendant is required to pay 
all debts and obligations associated with the property and shall 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
5. As it relates to the personal property of the parties, 
each of the parties is awarded the personal property in their 
possession as of the time of the trial in this case free and 
6 
clear of any interest of the other party• To the extent that any 
item of personal property held by a party is titled, the other 
party shall be required to sign any documents effecting the 
division of property. 
6. No offset is required as part of an overall equitable 
property settlement in this case and the award of the automobiles 
as they existed at the time of trial is confirmed.. 
7. As it relates to the debts and obligations of the 
marriage, there are no debts and obligations of the marriage 
with the exception of the obligations each of the parties owe on 
the real property awarded to them herein. Each of the parties is 
responsible to pay any separately incurred debts and obligations 
since the time of their separation. As it relates to any medical 
expenses that are owed for the minor child, the claims for said 
sums shall be submitted to the respective insurance carriers and 
each of the parties shall pay one-half of any amounts not 
covered. 
8. Each of the parties should be required to maintain a 
policy of health and accident insurance upon the minor child of 
the parties as the same is available to them through their 
respective places of employment. Further, eacrir—o£ the parties 
shall pay uii'i liulf uf any medical, dental, orthodontic,—optical 
or related expenses not covered by insurance. 
QINJI denial <yr/)erts<?s as uJell <xs or tlWoufv'c aw& c>^t\'^\ &xpenc*$ Art 
id be. ptu'd by y-J\<_ c<Kft\t^> <rA*.tU&\fe&6-k. 
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9. Each of the parties is restrained from annoying, 
harassing, or otherwise interfering in the lifestyle of the 
other and further restrained from making any disparaging comments 
to the minor child about each other or otherwise involving the 
minor child in the issues between the parties. 
10. The Defendant shall be required to name the minor child 
Prvbarthlu kid 
this marriage as beneficiary of any life insurance pnrrhnnrd 
by him or made available—Lu liifll—tluuuyh -hio omploimiQnjgfcto the 
32>% 
extent of JgS% of the value or death benefit thereof. 
11. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$404.95 as child support payable in two equal monthly payments on 
the 5th and 20th of each month commencing with July, 1989. 
12. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly 
payments on the 5th and 20th of each month commencing July, 1989. 
13. Plaintiff is not awarded judgment for back due house 
payments against the Defendant. 
14. The Court authorizes the entry of a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order in this case to be submitted to the employers of 
each of the parties awarding each of them one-half of the 
retirement programs of the other accrued during the course of the 
marriage including the Defendant's pension plan, claimed to be a 
substitute for social security, and the retirement account which 
8 
Defendant claims belongs to West Jordan City among the others 
testified to at trial. 
15. Each of the parties is entitled to one-half of the 
individual retirement account with accrued interest and the 
parties are ordered forthwith to distribute that amount so that 
each of the parties can •- choose their own retirement program, 
16. Each side should bear their own attorney's fees. 
17. Plaintiff is awarded her costs. 
DATED this day of 
Approved as to form: 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
9 
r. , , r. 
STEPHEN G HOMER (1536) 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone (801) 561-9665 
Defendant-Petitioner Pro Se 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C HOMER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs 
STEPHEN G HOMER, 
Defendant-Petitioner 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 87-2098 
Case assigned to Judge Harding 
Qjy..fe. -J"--
The Defendant-Petitioner STEPHEN G HOMER hereby petitions the 
Court for a modification of the Decree of Divorce, entered October 
1989, in the above-entitled action. 
This Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is based 
upon the following grounds: 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in August 
1980. 
2. In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed this action 
for divorce, seeking an absolute divorce upon grounds of 
"irreconcilable differences", and obtained a restraining 
order requiring the Defendant-Petitioner to leave 
permanently the marital residence. 
3. In October 1989 the Court entered a Decree of 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff the absolute divorce 
requested and ordered the Defendant to pay to the 
Plaintiff $150.00 per month in alimony. 
4. Beginning in August 1989 and continuously each month 
thereafter the Defendant has paid $1550.00 per month 
alimony to the Plaintiff. 
5. Subsection 30-3-5(6) (h), Utah Code, provides: 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time. 
6. There were and are no extenuating circumstances 
which justify the continuing and future payment of 
alimony. 
7. The Defendant-Petitioner is entitled to an Order 
modifying the Decree of Divorce, permanently and 
irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be 
paid. 
8. Continued requirement of alimony, in any amount, in 
this case deprives the Defendant-Petitioner of the 
constitutional rights guaranteed him under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and under the uniform 
operation of laws clause of Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
2 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTOWNEV AT LAW 
WHEREFORE, Defendant-Petitioner prays for the following relief: 
1. That the Court enter an Order, modifying the Decree 
of Divorce previously-entered and permanently and 
irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be 
paid to the Plaintiff; 
2. That the Court award judgment in favor of the 
Defendant-Petitioner for his attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in bringing and prosecuting this Petition; and 
3. That the Court award such other relief as is just. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1999. 
Plaintiff's address: 
KATHE C HOMER 
1015 East 500 North 
Orem, Utah 84097 
Defendant's address: 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
KATHE C. HOMER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 87-2098 
Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
-oooOooo 
Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian, moves 
the Court to dismiss the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed by Respondent on 
the following reasons and grounds set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed contemporaneously with this Motion. 
DATED this _C_ day of August, 1999. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
EXHIBIT MC" 0450 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _l£_ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to: 
Stephen G. Homer 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Kristine Wimmer Berg 
homer.mot 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
KATHE C. HOMER, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
: MOTION TO DISMISS 
Petitioner, : PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
: OF DECREE OF DIVORCE 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, : Civil No. 87-2098 
Respondent. : Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
oooOooo 
Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian, 
submits the following in support of her Motion to Dismiss Petition for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce. 
Pertinent Facts 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by this 
Court in October of 1989. 
2. Respondent was ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $150 per month until 
such time as Petitioner remarried, cohabited or until the death of either party. 
3. Petitioner has not remarried or cohabited and both parties are still living. 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Argument 
Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce should be dismissed for 
several reasons. 
First, the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted by this Court in that it fails to allege any substantial and material change 
of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Second, the amendment to UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-5, enacted by the legislature in 1995, 
cannot be applied retroactively; rather its application is prospective only. 
Third, the case of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton.767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) is 
analagous here. In that case, Mrs. Throckmorton sought to modify the Decree of Divorce to 
claim one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. The trial court found that her claim 
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Mrs. Throckmorton contended that Utah law did not 
recognize pension benefits as marital assets subject to distribution at the time of the divorce. 
She claimed that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982) recognized pension benefits as a marital asset, and that such recognition was in fact 
a substantial change of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
The Court of Appeals, in concluding that the subsequent recognition of retirement 
benefits was not a substantial change of circumstances, relied on the reasoning of the Arizona 
Court of Appeals in the case of Guffev v. LaChance. 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 
1980). The Utah Court stated: 
We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find that legal 
recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce has 
been entered is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change 
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of circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior property 
division. Thus, we hold that the legal principles articulated in 
Woodward, should only be given prospective application. 
Id. at 
Similarly, the statutory amendment limiting alimony to a period not to exceed the 
duration of the marriage should not be given retroactive application. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce should be 
dismissed, and Petitioner should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs she has incurred by 
defending against it. 
DATED th i s^_ day of August, 1999. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this [$ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE to: 
Stephen G. Homer 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Kristine Wimmer Berg 
homer.mem 
04 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
.Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 87-2098 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral 
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce was 
entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and 20th of 
each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each 
month since August 1989. 
At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony would 
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a showing 
that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide that 
f,[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
EXHIBIT "E" 048*4 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). 
The Defendant contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires this 
Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that 
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from 
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months 
(from August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances 
justifying the payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as 
now required by the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to 
pay alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h). 
The Plaintiff responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply to this 
action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly applies to 
this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the 
law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994 seeking 
to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IdL at 441. In January 1996 
the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. LI Between the filing of the original and 
amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. IcL One effect of the 1995 
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the 
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. IcL This raised the issue 
of whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to 
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the petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced 
with the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive 
change that could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the 
petition to modify. M. at 443. 
In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies retroactively 
because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant action was 
initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Defendant filed his Petition for Modification. Because 
subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated, it applies 
to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law. 
However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive of the 
issues raised in Defendant's Petition to Modify. The Defendant would have this Court 
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony 
entered prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the 
marriage existed, unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the 
statute requires. The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the 
legislative intent behind the statute provide for such a result. 
The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language of 
the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in 
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony 
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the 
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power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case. Such a 
result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. Furthermore, 
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides 
that an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously 
entered alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering 
orders awarding alimony. Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the 
Divorce Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. 
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Petition for Modification should be dismissed 
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe 
the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge 
all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1991). Defendant's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that this 
Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth 
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate 
Plaintiffs alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a 
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Defendant has failed to allege any 
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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The Defendant argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to terminate 
the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states 
that "[a]U laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Defendant reasons that 
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in pre-
1995 divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons 
under the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced 
prior to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for the number of 
years the marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances. However, the 
Court finds that subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform 
Operation of Law Clause because it does not create any type of classification. 
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law 
Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat 
them differently. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does 
not violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or 
treat one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive 
law regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for 
a period longer than the marriage existed. 
Furthermore, the Defendant is not now treated any differently under subsection (7)(h) 
than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Defendant must meet in order 
to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his Decree was 
entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the movant to 
"show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not originally 
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contemplated within the decree itself/ Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different 
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated 
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been 
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable 
power of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the 
marriage existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional under either the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
The Defendant also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate his 
obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the 
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why 
the statute would violate this provision. The provision states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce 
Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not bar 
Defendant from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Defendant can petition this Court 
for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). 
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Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is DISMISSED. 
2. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this 
ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this rday of October; 1999 
V ^ P S O J ^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid thereon this I day of November, 1999, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Law Clerk 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-7444 
Telephone: (801) 531-8885 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Respondent. 
-ooOoo-
FTNDINGS OF FACT AND 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 87-2098 
-ooOoo-
Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Defendant's 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce on Friday, October 29, 1999, before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr., Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court. Petitioner, 
KATHE C. HOMER, was present in person and represented by her counsel, Helen E. Christian. 
Respondent, STEPHEN G. HOMER, was present in person and pro se- The Court heard the 
arguments of counsel and took the matter under advisement for further determinations. The 
Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, considered the oral arguments, 
and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following: 
EXHIBTT "F" 0 4 9 * 
Findings of Fact 
1. The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce 
was entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and 
20th of each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each 
month since August 1989. 
2. At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony 
would automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a 
showing that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide 
that "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). 
3. The Respondent contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires 
this Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that 
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from 
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months (from 
August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances justisfying the 
payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as now required by 
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the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to pay alimony for a 
period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h). 
4. The Petitioner responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply 
to this action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly 
applies to this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an 
action is the law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 
442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994 
seeking to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IcL at 441. In January 
1996 the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. Id Between the filing of the original 
and amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. Id One effect of the 1995 
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the 
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. Id This raised the issue 6 
whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to the 
petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced with 
the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive change that 
could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the petition to 
modify. Id at 443. 
5. In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies 
retroactively because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant 
action was initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Respondent filed his Petition for Modification. 
Because subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated, 
it applies to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law. 
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6. However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive 
of the issues raised in Respondent's Petition to Modify. The Respondent would have this Court 
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony entered 
prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the marriage existed, 
unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the statute requires. 
The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the legislative intent behind 
the statute provide for such a result. 
7. The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period 
of time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language 
of the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in 
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony 
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the 
power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case.; Such 
a result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1.- Furthermore, 
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides that 
an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously entered 
alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering orders 
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awarding alimony. Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce 
Decree and terminate Plaintiff s alimony award. 
8. Petitioner contends that Respondent's Petition for Modification should be 
dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must 
construe the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and 
indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 
1055 (Utah 1991). Respondent's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that 
this Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth 
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate 
Petitioner's alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a 
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Respondent has failed to allege any 
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
9. The Respondent argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to 
terminate the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment to 
the United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states 
that "[a] 11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Respondent reasons that 
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in prel995 
divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons under 
the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced prior 
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to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for the number of years the 
marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances.. However, the Court finds that 
subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform Operation of Law 
Clause because it does not create any type of classification. 
10. The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law 
Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat 
them differently. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does not 
violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or treat 
one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive law 
regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for a 
period longer than the marriage existed. 
11. Furthermore, the Respondent is not now treated any differently under subsection 
(7)(h) than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Respondent must meet 
in order to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his 
Decree was entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the 
movant to "show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not 
originally contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (UtahCt. 
App.1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified 
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different 
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated 
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been 
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable power 
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of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the marriage 
existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional under either the 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
12. The Respondent also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate 
his obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the 
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why the 
statute would violate this provision. The provision states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
I shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
UtahConst. Art. I, § 11. 
13. As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the 
Divorce Decree and terminate Petitioner's alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not 
bar Respondent from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Respondent can petition this 
Court for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). 
Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. 
O R D E R 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court enters the following Order: 
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Respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this 'gr /day of November, 1999. 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby 
notified that Petitioner's counsel will forward the original hereof to the Court for signature, 
and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to file any written 
objections to the form of the foregoing order with the Court and mail a copy to Petitioner's 
counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original hereof will be signed and 
filed. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, this _%_ day of November, 1999, addressed to: 
Stephen G. Homer 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Kristine Wimmer Berg 
homer.ord 
0490 
